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Abstract: Although by regional standards, Kenya’s financial system is relatively well developed 
and diversified, major structural impediments prevent it from reaching its full potential. Cross-
country comparisons, however, show the importance of a well-developed financial sector for 
long-term economic growth and poverty alleviation. Experience from other developing 
economies has shown the detrimental effect of government ownership and the positive impact 
that foreign bank ownership can have on the development of a market-based financial system.  
Analyzing and decomposing the high interest rate spreads and margins in Kenya helps identify 
structural impediments that drive the high cost of and low access to financial services. The 
limited information sharing on debtors, deficiencies in the legal and judicial system, the limited 
number of strong and reputable banks and non-transparency and uncertainty in the banking 
market are major impediments to the development of Kenya’s financial system, to reducing 
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I. Kenya’s Financial System in International Comparison 
 Although by regional standards, Kenya’s financial system is relatively well developed 
and diversified, major structural impediments prevent it from reaching its full potential. Table 1 
shows that the Kenyan financial system enjoys higher levels of credit channeled to the private 
sector and higher deposits in financial institutions than other Sub-Saharan African and low-
income countries; however, as one might expect and for the reasons explored in this paper, there 
is a wide gap compared with OECD countries. Table 1 also shows that Kenya has a lower 
concentration ratio than not only other countries in the region, but also the average OECD 
country.  A complete list of the Kenyan banks, their market share and ownership structure is 
provided in Annex I. 
 
 Table 1: Kenya’s Banking System in International Comparison 
 
 Private Credit/GDP Financial Deposits/GDP Bank Concentration 
Kenya 25.6 33.2 39.3 
Sub-Saharan Africa 18.7 23.5 77.0 
Low-income countries 16.0 19.5 74.2 
OECD countries 92.6 113.5 47.9 
 
Sources: Private Credit/GDP is total claims of financial institutions on the domestic private non-financial sector as 
share of GDP. Financial deposits/GDP is total deposits in financial institutions as share of GDP. Bank Concentration 
is the share of assets of the largest three banks in total banking sector assets.  Source: Update of financial structure 
database, World Bank.  All data are for 2001. 
  
 Cross-country comparisons have shown the importance of a well-developed financial 
sector for long-term economic growth and poverty alleviation.  Countries with better developed 
banking systems and capital markets enjoy higher growth rates; and it is the poorest segments of 
society that stand to gain most (Beck, Levine and Loayza, 2000; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Levine, 2004; for an overview, see World Bank, 2001). Figure 1 shows the empirical relationship 
between credit to the private sector as share of GDP and GDP per capita growth for a sample of 
52 developing and developed countries over the period 1960 to 1999. Figure 2 shows the 
empirical relationship between credit to the private sector as share of GDP and income growth of 
the poorest quintile of each country’s population for the same sample and the same period.  Both 
exercises control for other factors that can explain cross-country variation in the growth of 
overall GDP per capita and the income of the poor.  The positive relationships in Figures 1 and 2 
do not just reflect correlations between financial development and income growth; well-
developed financial intermediaries and markets exert a causal impact on economic development 
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and poverty alleviation. 
 












This partial scatter graph plots the residual of a regression of GDP per capita growth on initial GDP per capita, 
school attainment, inflation, government consumption and trade openness versus the residual of a regression of 
Private Credit/GDP on the same regressors. For details, see Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2004).  
 












This partial scatter graph plots the residual of a regression of income growth of the poorest income quintile on initial 
GDP per capita, school attainment, inflation, government consumption and trade openness versus the residual of a 













































 Well-developed financial institutions and markets foster economic development by 
improving the allocation of society’s scarce resources rather than by facilitating faster capital 
accumulation or increased savings (Beck, Levine and Loayza, 2000).  A well-developed 
financial system widens access to external finance and channels resources to the sectors that need 
them most (Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998; Wurgler, 2000). 
Finally, effective financial institutions and markets can help economies cope better with 
exogenous shocks such as terms of trade volatility and move them away from natural resource 
based development (Beck, 2002; Raddatz, 2003).  
 Financial markets are different from other markets in that they involve the intertemporal 
exchange of monetary resources: money today for the promise of money tomorrow. Lack of 
information about the counterpart, lack of monitoring and enforcement tools vis-à-vis the 
counterpart and uncertainty about the value of money tomorrow can hamper the efficiency of this 
exchange and thus the efficient functioning of financial markets.  Governments have an 
important role to play in reducing these frictions and making financial markets work efficiently. 
Transparency – higher accounting and disclosure standards for both borrowers and banks – and 
market discipline reduce information and monitoring problems. Effective protection of outside 
investors, both bank creditors and minority shareholders, as well as contract enforcement and 
property right protection in general help reduce monitoring and enforcement problems. Monetary 
stability is a pre-condition for market participants to be willing to engage in long-term financial 
contracts.    
 While governments have an important role in creating an enabling environment for 
efficient financial markets, experience in both developed and developing countries has shown the 
negative impact of government ownership on financial development. Formerly seen as a 
necessary tool to foster financial and economic development, government-owned banks have 
fallen far short of delivering on their promises and have prevented especially developing 
economies from building market-based financial systems.  Countries with a higher share of 
government-owned banks have experienced lower GDP per capita growth, less effective resource 
allocation, lower and more concentrated access to credit and higher interest rate spreads (La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2002; Barth, Caprio and Levine, 2004).  
 While government ownership in banking can impede financial development, poorly 
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designed privatization in a weak institutional environment can make things worse.  Experiences 
in many developing countries have shown that privatization to connected insiders and/or 
privatization in an environment where neither market participants nor bank supervisors are able 
to properly monitor and discipline banks, can result in compromised government policies, fraud, 
looting and even a banking crisis.  Timid and slow restructuring and delays in the privatization 
process, however, can also be costly, prolonging the day of reckoning, and result in larger costs 
in the form of a high share of non-performing loans, repeated need for government-financed 
recapitalization and, not least, an extended period of reduced efficiency and competitiveness of 
financial intermediation. The experience in many Central and Eastern European countries has 
shown the importance of coordinating the privatization processes in the financial and non-
financial sector (Caprio, 1995). Experience in many developing countries has also shown that 
partial privatization is not sufficient to resolve governance problems (Beck, Cull and Jerome, 
2004). 
 There may not be a single optimal privatization method, but experience from other 
countries has provided some lessons on how to gain the greatest potential benefit from the 
privatization process while minimizing the risks. To encourage private investment in banking 
and growth in financial intermediation, it is important to send credible signals to the market and 
the public that privatization will be undertaken over a defined time period, while significant 
regulatory improvements are undertaken to ensure that the privatized bank will comply with 
regulatory requirements and be subject to market and supervisory discipline.  Complete 
transparency in the privatization process and applying strict fit and proper requirements to the 
new private owners are of utmost importance. 
 Cross-country comparisons have shown the benefits of foreign bank ownership for 
developing countries, while providing little evidence for adverse consequences on access to or 
cost of financial services (Claessens and Jansen, 2000, Clarke et al., 2003).  In addition to 
investment in the capitalization of financial institutions foreign banks usually bring with them 
better know-how and technical capacity, which then spills over to the rest of the banking system.  
They impose competitive pressure on domestic banks, increasing efficiency of financial 
intermediation. They provide more stability to the financial system, being able to draw on 
liquidity resources of their parent banks. Finally, there is even evidence that access to credit is 
higher in countries with a larger share of foreign-owned banks (Clarke, Cull and Martinez-Peria, 
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2002).  These results suggest that even in those cases where foreign banks have focused more 
narrowly on the top end of the market rather than providing financial services to small 
borrowers, they can force domestic banks to re-focus on the small borrower segments.   
 While endorsing the benefits associated with foreign ownership, experience with 
privatization of state-owned banks in Africa has demonstrated that careful preparation and 
execution of the privatization process – even when involving reputable foreign banks – is of the 
utmost importance. Whether in the form of privatization of government-owned banks to foreign 
entities or new entry by foreign banks, experience in developing countries has shown that foreign 
bank entry is not a panacea and cannot substitute for an effective regulatory and supervisory 
framework.  As is generally the case, sale of domestic banking assets needs to be subject to 
stringent due diligence regarding the “fit and proper” status of prospective foreign owners. 
Further, in a growing number of cases international banks are committed to a developmentally-
oriented focus – in some cases working in association with development partners (which can 
provide more “patient capital” looking to longer-term returns than associated with private 
capital) – and are re-orienting their business model toward the needs of developing countries in 
maintaining and improving access to financial services, especially in rural and remote regions. 
Encouraging the entry of developmentally-oriented but financially sound banks can contribute to 
enhancing access to credit by reducing the segmentation between “mainstream” finance provided 
by banks and the market for smaller credit, which in recent years has been developed on a 
commercial, but as yet much smaller basis by smaller banks, credit cooperatives (SACCOs) and 
micro-finance institutions (MFIs).  
  
2. Interest Spreads and Margins in International Comparison 
High interest spreads and limited depth and breadth of the financial systems are closely 
related to each other.  Countries with higher interest rate spreads have lower levels of credit to 
the private sector as share of GDP and deposits in the financial system as share of GDP (Figure 
3).  High interest spreads and margins and limited depth and breadth of financial services are the 
result of underlying deficiencies and impediments in the financial systems; in order to increase 



















This graph plots Private Credit/GDP and interest spreads for a sample of 83 countries for 2001. Data are from 
International Financial Statistics and the Financial Structure Database update from the World Bank. 
   
Trying to reduce spreads by regulating and controlling interest rates carries high risks of 
counterproductive effects. Administratively limiting lending rates would most likely result in 
(i) credit rationing and (ii) an increase in hidden charges to compensate for lost interest revenue. 
Both will hurt smaller borrowers especially hard, resulting in less access to credit. 
Administratively fixing deposit rates at a minimum level will, apart from the negative impact on 
banks’ soundness, most likely result in banks (i) raising minimum deposits and (ii) charging 
additional fees to compensate for the higher cost. Again, this will hurt small depositors more 
than large depositors. Similarly, trying to expand access to financial services through 
government programs that provide subsidized credit results carries the risks of (i) crowding out 
private providers, (ii) poor targeting, i.e. providing large subsidies to few borrowers who might 
have access to private financial services, (iii) undermining credit discipline in the case of 
politically motivated debt forgiveness. Depending on the chosen delivery mechanism for such 
subsidies their cost to society can be much higher than the direct cost of subsidy. For example, a 
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found that the Kenyan Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) not only accumulated very 
sizeable non-performing assets (equivalent to about 90 percent of their loan portfolios), but also 
operated with very high overheads.   
 
Table 2:  Interest Rates, Spreads, and Margins in International Comparison 
 
 Real lending rate Real deposit rate Interest spread  Interest margin 
Kenya 16.5 3.5 13.0 9.2 
Sub-Saharan Africa 9.9 -1.5 11.5 8.1 
Of which: Uganda 19.4 5.9 13.5 12.7 
                  Tanzania 12.0 -1.2 13.1 7.5 
Low-income countries 10.8 -1.6 12.4 7.8 
OECD countries 4.6 0.5 4.1 3.6 
 
Sources: Real lending (deposit) interest rates are the difference between average lending (deposit) interest rates for 
2002 and the log of CPI inflation for 2002. The interest spread is the difference between deposit and lending rates. 
The net interest margins is the net interest revenue relative to total earning assets; data are from the World Bank 
Financial Structure Database based on raw data from Bankscope, for 2001.  
 
While Kenya has similarly high interest rate spreads and margins as other countries in the 
region, it has substantially higher spreads and margins than OECD countries (Table 2). This 
underlines the importance of analyzing the structural deficiencies that drive the high spreads and 
the limited access.  It also allows us to draw on the experience of other countries when designing 
policies to reduce spreads and increase access.1 
Decomposition of the interest spreads points to overhead costs and the profit margin as 
the most important component of the interest rate spread in Kenya (Table 3).2 State-banks have 
the highest spread, followed by foreign-owned banks and privately owned Kenyan banks. While 
this might point to inefficiencies in foreign banks relative to privately owned domestic banks, we 
will discuss below that it is the reputational contagion associated with small private domestic 
banks that obliges the smaller domestic banks to pay relatively high interest rates on funds 
deposited with them and allows foreign banks to enjoy higher profit margins and therefore higher 
spreads. Overhead costs and loan loss provisions constitute two-thirds of government-owned 
banks’ spread, while overhead costs and the profit margin constitute two-thirds of the spread of 
privately owned banks. While the profit margin seems relatively high, we note that this is only 
the profit on lending, the most risky line of business for banks. The overall profitability for banks 
                                                 
1 The Brazilian Central Bank has undertaken significant analytical work on interest rate spreads: www.bcb.gov.br 
2 Annex II describes the decomposition in more detail. 
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is significantly lower, as indicated by the return on assets, which is of a level comparable to other 
banking markets. 
 
Table 3. Kenya: Decomposition of Interest Spreads 
 
 All banks State-owned banks Domestic private Foreign banks 
Overhead cost 5.6 4.4 5.3 6.6 
Loan loss provisions 2.5 4.9 1.5 1.8 
Reserve requirements 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.2 
Tax 1.9 2.2 1.6 2.1 
Profit margin 4.5 5.2 3.7 4.9 
Total spread 14.9 16.9 12.5 15.5 
Return on Assets (after tax) 1.4 -0.4 1.0 3.0 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the CBK. All data are for 2002 
 
An analysis of the overhead costs shows that they are driven by wage costs, which 
constitute 50 percent of total overhead costs. Other factors relating to the costs of financial 
service provision in the local market include fraud, security costs, the inefficient payment system 
and a heavy regulatory burden, as illustrated by high reporting requirements, the annual re-
licensing process, and licensing procedures for the opening and closing of branches. Compared 
to banks in other Sub-Saharan African countries and other emerging countries, Kenyan banks 
seem to be overstaffed and their employees less productive (Table 4). Kenyan banks have more 
than three times as many employees for a given amount of assets, loans and deposits than other 
banks in emerging countries, and the average Kenyan bank employee earns only half of the net 
interest revenue as the average employee in emerging markets. 
 
Table 4: Bank Productivity in International Comparison 
 
 Net interest/employee Assets/employee Loans/employee Deposits/employee 
Kenya 36 581 295 458 
Sub-Saharan Africa 49 1,073 505 742 
Emerging markets 60 2,040 911 1,620 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from Bankscope. All data are for 2002 and in thousands USD. 
 
 
However, there are large differences in productivity across different ownership groups of 
Kenyan banks. Employees in state-owned banks earn only half of the net interest revenue of 
employees in foreign-owned banks. State-owned banks have twice as many employees relative 
to their assets, loans and deposits as foreign-owned banks. The higher productivity of foreign-
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owned banks compensates for the higher wage costs of these banks compared to domestic banks. 
Private domestic banks are less productive and more overstaffed than foreign-owned banks, but 
more productive and less overstaffed than state-owned banks. This disparity across ownership 
groups indicates significant potential gains from increased competition and the resulting 
productivity improvements.  
 
Table 5. Bank Productivity across Different Kenyan Bank Groups 
 
 Net interest/employee Assets/employee Loans/employee Deposits/employee 
State-owned banks 23 303 187 222 
Private domestic banks 31 577 317 447 
Foreign banks 50 770 349 625 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from CBK. All data are for 2002 and in thousands USD. 
 
Interest margins and overhead costs are almost twice as large in Kenya as in other 
countries and empirical findings show that two-thirds of the difference can be explained by the 
deficient Kenyan legal and institutional framework and the relatively smaller size of Kenyan 
banks (Table 6). To compare net interest margins and overhead costs of Kenyan banks with net 
interest margins and overhead costs in other countries, we use the results of a recent study of the 
determinants of net interest margins by Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven and Levine (2004). This study 
used bank-level data from Bankscope for 72 countries to explore the empirical relationship 
between bank and country characteristics and net interest margins and overhead costs relative to 
total assets.  Unlike in the analysis of interest spreads, we do not decompose the interest margin 
or the overhead costs, but rather try to relate them to specific bank and country characteristics. 
While the study by Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven and Levine (2004) uses data over 1995-99 and has a 
limited sample of banks for each country, we use data for 38 Kenyan banks for the year 2002, 
thus covering 98 percent of the banking system.3 We multiply the coefficient estimates from two 
regressions in that paper (Table 8, column 3 and Table 11, column 3) with the difference 
between values of the respective variables for Kenya and the mean value for all countries in the 
study to identify the factors that most contribute to the high interest margins and overhead costs 
in Kenya.  
                                                 
3 Due to the different nature of their business, we excluded IDB, DBK, and K-Rep Bank. The difference between the 
interest margin numbers for Kenya in Table 2 and Table 6 is due to the different data sources used (cross-country 




Table 6. Net Interest Margins and Overhead Costs in International Comparison 
 
 Interest margin Overhead costs 
Kenya  7.0 5.9 
World-wide average 3.6 3.0 
Difference 3.4 2.9 
Of which: Property right protection 1.4 0.8 
                 Bank size 0.9 0.7 
                 Other bank characteristics -0.3 0.5 
                 Other country characteristics 0.1 0.0 
                 Kenya residual 1.2 0.8 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using data and results from Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven and Levine (2004) and data from 
CBK. 
 
This cross-country comparison shows that by far the largest factor explaining the higher 
margins in Kenya is the comparably deficient legal and institutional framework – according to 
the regressions model accounting for approximately 1.4 percentage points of the higher net 
interest margins. This factor also provides the most important explanation for the higher 
overheads costs – accounting for 0.8 percentage points of the costs. The relative smaller size – 
thus the lack of scale economies – of Kenyan banks explains 0.9 percentage points of the higher 
net interest margin and 0.7 percentage points of the higher overhead costs. The lack of a sound 
legal and institutional environment and the small size of Kenyan banks are thus the two most 
important factors in explaining why net interest margins and overhead costs are almost twice as 
high in Kenya as in the rest of the world. Overall, this analysis of net interest margins and 
overhead costs confirms the decomposition analysis of interest rate spreads and international 
productivity comparisons.  The deficient legal and institutional framework can explain the high 
loan loss provisions of Kenyan banks, but also the relatively high profit margin, as we will 
discuss in the next section.  The deficient legal and institutional framework – fraud and 
insecurity – and the relatively small size of Kenyan banks can explain high overhead costs and 
the low productivity of Kenyan banks.  
 
3. Is the Kenyan Banking Market Competitive?  
While loan loss provisions and overhead costs explain a large part of interest rate spreads, 
there is still a relatively high profit margin, which raises the question of the competitiveness of 
the Kenyan banking system.  Traditional measures of concentration in the banking industry, such 
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as the three-bank concentration ratio, the number of banks, or a Herfindahl index would suggest 
a relatively high degree of competitiveness of the Kenyan banking system.4 
Cross-country comparisons, however, have shown that the competitiveness of a banking 
market is not necessarily linked to market structure measures such as the Herfindahl index, the 
number of banks or concentration ratios (Claessens and Laeven, 2004). Contestability of the 
market, the threat of entry, can be a more important determinant of bank behavior. Entry barriers 
and competition from other financial institutions (such as insurance companies, large credit 
cooperatives, and capital markets) can play an important role in determining banking system 
competitiveness. Ownership structure can be important for the degree of competition, since 
banks with different ownership often have different mandates and different clienteles.  
Anecdotal evidence suggests that most customers in Kenya below the top tier of 
corporate and wealthy borrowers face a non-competitive banking market and are often 
effectively tied to one bank, with very high switching costs. While recent changes in the interest 
rate structure – and the sharp fall in money market rates in particular – have resulted in more 
aggressive marketing by banks, there are structural impediments to a more competitive banking 
market, which relate primarily to lack of information on both sides of the market and 
segmentation of the banking market. 
 
4. Policies to Foster Competition, Reduce Spreads and Widen Access 
As discussed above, the problems of high spreads and limited access cannot be helped by 
short-term government-directed solutions that work against market forces.  Rather, the 
Government should focus on implementing policy reforms to alleviate market, institutional and 
political barriers to competition.  In the following, we discuss four areas, in which policy reforms 
can have a major impact in reducing such barriers and thus increasing the effectiveness and 
competitiveness of financial intermediation, thereby reducing spreads and widening access.   
First, lack of information sharing on debtors increases banks’ credit risk and reduces the 
competitiveness of the banking system. The absence of reliable information on potential 
borrowers increases the adverse selection risk for banks resulting in higher credit risk and loan 
loss provisions, which in turn raises interest rate spreads. The inability of borrowers to build up a 
                                                 
4 Using data for May 2003, the Herfindahl is 947 for banks’ assets and 1,045 when using banks’ loans. This 
corresponds to a system with 11 banks of equal size.  
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positive credit history prevents them from accessing bank finance and increases the costs of 
switching lenders, effectively tying borrowers to one bank. The resulting rents increase the profit 
margin of banks and thus interest rate spreads. 
A well functioning credit registry with a firm legal basis including provisions for data and 
consumer protection, which offers both negative and positive information on borrowers, and a 
broader user group can reduce credit risk for banks and increase access to credit. Sharing of 
positive information will especially benefit small borrowers, as it will allow them to establish 
reputation with small loans and improve their chances to increase their borrowings as their 
business grows. In addition to information sharing among institutions governed under the 
Banking Act, it is recommended to also include building societies, microfinance institutions 
(MFIs) and SACCOs in the information sharing mechanisms. This may allow micro and small 
borrowers to graduate from microfinance to bank finance as their business develops. Information 
sharing among all finance providers would be extremely beneficial for reducing segmentation 
and increasing competition within the financial system. 
Second, deficiencies in the legal and institutional framework increase credit risk for 
banks and limit the scope of assets available as acceptable security, effectively tying debtors to 
one bank.  Only few borrowers have access to unsecured lending due to deficiencies in 
contractual enforcement procedures. Problems in perfecting and registering security increase 
credit risk for lenders and result in higher loan loss provisions. The high costs of taking security 
(stamp duties and legal fees) and the chaotic state of property registries limit the scope of assets 
available as acceptable security and constitute an effective barrier for borrowers who might 
consider switching lenders.  
Strengthening the legal framework will be crucial to improving the lending environment 
and reducing interest rate spreads. Legal reforms should include (i) reform of the Companies 
Registry to simplify registry procedures and allow for speedy and accurate information sharing 
of corporate information and data,5 (ii) reform and consolidation of the land registration 
framework to allow speedier searches as well as establishing more efficient mechanisms for 
registering and enforcing security interests over land and other real estate, (iii) strengthening and 
simplifying debt collection processes, including the introduction of procedures such as small 
claims procedures, summary procedures for uncontested debt, and alternative dispute resolution 
                                                 
5 This might include creating a separate registry for charges over movable assets. 
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procedures, and (iv) institutional reform and training of judges. The combined effect of these 
measures would be to reduce credit risk for banks and help borrowers that would like to switch 
lenders.  
Third, the limited number of large and strong banks constrains the competitiveness of the 
Kenyan banking system and has resulted in market segmentation due to the limited movement of 
funds and clients across different subsectors, such as banks and MFIs. There is a reputational 
bias against small banks, since many small banks are fragile and weak. Depositors therefore 
prefer large foreign or state-owned banks. Further, many small banks, be they strong or weak, 
operate in niche markets. As state-owned banks are not primarily profit-oriented, competition is 
effectively limited to large foreign banks. This goes to explain the higher profit margins and 
therefore interest spreads of foreign-owned banks relative to domestic private banks, as 
discussed above. 
Regulatory and supervisory efforts to strengthen the banking system can help reduce the 
interest rate spreads and foster competition. Regulatory and supervisory measures to strengthen 
the Kenyan banking system should include: (i) divesture of the Kenyan state from the banks in 
which it holds a stake, (ii) rapid intervention into weak and failing banks, and (iii) granting 
autonomy with accountability to the CBK as bank regulatory and supervisory authority. These 
steps will enhance competition between a larger number of privately-owned and profit-oriented 
medium-sized and large banks. Action along these lines will also help reduce the reputational 
bias against small banks. While the outcome might be a smaller number of banks, this can result 
in more competition in the banking market.  
Finally, uncertainty in the policy environment concerning the control or regulation of 
interest rates and related bank fees has an adverse effect on the predictability and transparency of 
bank tariffs. Legal provisions of the Central Bank Amendment Act 2000 and Section 44 of the 
Banking Act stipulate that prior approval of the Minister of Finance is required for changes in the 
rate of banking or other charges, thereby creating uncertainty about the Government’s 
commitment to market-based financial policies.  Eliminating all references to controls on interest 
rates and charges and launching a deliberate and transparent divestiture program for the 
Government’s remaining stakes in the banking systems are two crucial steps towards improving 
certainty in the policy environment.  Both steps will underline the resolution of the Government 
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to move towards a market-based financial system and redefine the role of the Government as 
enabler rather than actor in the financial system.  
Rather than controlling or regulating interest rates, the role of the Government should be 
to foster transparency in the market place.  More transparency in the structure of interest rates 
across banks, both according to product and maturity, can enhance the competitiveness of the 
banking system by allowing customers to make a better-informed decision. However, the 
improvement in competition has to be weighted against a potential increase in moral hazard risks 
if weak banks succeed to attract additional liquidity through higher (even well publicized) 
deposit interest rates. Overall, however, the benefits from improved competition are likely to 
outweigh the moral hazard risk, which can be detained by a strengthening of bank supervision. 
By divesting its remaining ownership stakes in the banking industry the Government will 
demonstrate its commitment not only to lowering spreads and increasing competition, but also to 
prudent fiscal management and good governance. Given the fiscal burdens and the record of 
political interference and corruption associated with the Government’s ownership of banks, 
considerable non-tangible benefits will follow as a result of the divestiture program. These 
benefits will take the form of greater confidence in the Government’s fiscal management and 
commitment to good governance, as well as in the form of foreign capital inflows, reflecting 
greater confidence by foreign investors in the sound development of the Kenyan economy.  
 
5.  Conclusions 
 This paper has emphasized the role of Government in building an enabling environment 
for sound and market-based financial development.  Using the decomposition of interest spreads 
and international comparisons of the determinants of interest margins, we have focused on the 
underlying structural deficiencies that have prevented the Kenyan financial system from 
fulfilling its role in fostering effective resource allocation and economic development.  We have 
identified several major policy areas. By restructuring and divesting completely from 
government-owned banks, by intervening rapidly and decisively into failing banks and by 
creating autonomous but accountable financial regulators and supervisors, the authorities can 
create a sound and stable banking system, and provide the foundation for reducing spreads and 
increasing access. By furthermore addressing existing market, institutional and political barriers 
to information sharing, contract enforcement and transparency and certainty in the banking 
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market, policy makers will be able to assist in reducing spreads and widening access.  
 None of the policies identified is by itself a silver bullet to resolve the problems of high 
spreads and limited access and they may only appear to have an effect in the medium to longer 
term. However, taken together, they may have a significant positive impact even in the shorter 
term due to a ‘virtuous cycle’ effect, as mentioned above.  Yet, previous short-term Government-
directed attempts to reduce costs and widen access have not fulfilled their promises.  On the 
contrary, they have impeded market-based financial development. Government ownership in 
banking has led to a build-up in non-performing loans resulting in larger spreads constraining 
access to financial services and high fiscal liabilities.  Development finance institutions (DFIs) 
have had a disastrous track record of providing few borrowers with large subsidies and 
undermining credit discipline with widespread debt forgiveness. Political attempts to impose 
lower spreads through legislation have resulted in uncertainty in the market place, non-
transparency and reduced access for small depositors and borrowers.   
 Kenya’s financial system has considerable potential to foster economic development and 
alleviate poverty.  While the analysis of this paper has pointed to structural deficiencies, its main 
message is one of hope.  By adopting a wide range of market-based reforms that address market, 
institutional and political failures, the current Government can make a substantial contribution to 
creating a financial sector that allocates society’s savings to its most productive uses and enables 
firms and households access to necessary financial services.  The Government should not try to 
replace or compete with private providers of financial services. Instead, the single most 
important contribution the Government can make to reduce interest spreads and widen access is 




Barth, J., Caprio, G., R. Levine. 2004. Bank Supervision and Regulation: What Works Best? 
Journal of Financial Intermediation, forthcoming. 
 
Beck, T., 2002, Financial Development and International Trade: Is There a Link? Journal of 
International Economics 57, 107-131 
 
Beck, T., Levine, R., Loayza, N., 2000. Finance and the Sources of Growth. Journal of Financial 
Economics 58, 261-300. 
 
Beck, T., Cull, R., Jerome, A., 2004. Bank Privatization and Performance. Empirical Evidence 
from Nigeria, World Bank mimeo. 
 
Beck, T., Demirgüç-Kunt, A., Levine, R., 2004, Finance, Inequality and Poverty: Cross-Country 
Evidence, World Bank mimeo. 
 
Caprio, G., 1995. The Role of Financial Intermediaries in Transitional Economies, Carnegie-
Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 42, 257-302. 
 
Claessens, C., Jansen, M., 2000, The Internationalization of Financial Services: Issues and 
Lessons for Developing Countries. Dordrecht, Holland: Kluwer.  
 
Claessens, C., Laeven, L., 2004, Journal of Money, What Drive Bank Competition?  Some 
International Evidence. Credit and Banking, forthcoming.  
 
Clarke, G., Cull, R., Martinez-Peria, M., 2002, Does Foreign Bank Penetration Reduce Access to 
Credit in Developing Countries? Evidence from Asking Borrowers, World Bank mimeo. 
 
Clarke, G., Cull, R., Martinez-Peria, M., Sancez, S., 2003. Foreign Bank Entry: Experience, 
Implications for Developing Countries, and Agenda for Further Research, World Bank Research 
Observer 18, 25-59. 
 
Demirgüç-Kunt, A., Laeven, L., Levine, R., 2004, Impact of Bank Regulations, Concentration, 
and Institutions on Bank Margins. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, forthcoming. 
 
Demirgüç-Kunt, A., Maksimovic, V., 1998. Law, Finance, and Firm Growth. Journal of Finance 
53, 2107-2137. 
 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., 2002. Government Ownership of Commercial 
Banks. Journal of Finance 57, 265-301. 
 
Raddatz, C., 2003. Liquidity Needs and the Vulnerability to Financial Underdevelopment, World 
Bank mimeo. 
 




World Bank, 2001. Finance for Growth, Policy Choices in A Volatile World, Washington D.C. 
 
Wurgler, J. 2000. Financial Markets and the Allocation of Capital. Journal of Financial 
Economics 58, 187-214. 
 18
ANNEX I:  THE STRUCTURE OF THE KENYAN BANKING SYSTEM 
 
Ownership
Bank Name KSh bn %
1 Barclays Bank of Kenya Ltd 91.9 20.5 Foreign
2 Standard Chartered Bank Ltd 61.9 13.8 Foreign
3 Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd 58.5 13.1 Government
4 Citibank, N.A. 28.9 6.5 Foreign
5 Co-operative Bank of Kenya 28.5 6.4 Private
6 National Bank of Kenya Ltd 26.1 5.8 Government
7 Commercial Bank of Africa 15.6 3.5 Private
8 Investment & Mortgages Bank 10.1 2.3 Private
9 CFC Bank Limited 9.9 2.2 Private
10 National Industrial Credit Bank 8.8 2.0 Private
11 Stambic Bank Kenya Limited 8.3 1.8 Foreign
12 Diamond Trust Bank Kenya 6.5 1.4 Foreign
13 First American Bank Limited 6.3 1.4 Private
14 Bank of Baroda 5.9 1.3 Foreign
15 Credit Agricole Indosuez 5.8 1.3 Foreign
16 Fina Bank Limited 5.2 1.2 Private
17 Bank of India 5.1 1.1 Foreign
18 Akiba Bank Ltd 4.4 1.0 Private
19 Prime Bank Limited 4.2 0.9 Private
20 Giro Commercial Bank 4.1 0.9 Private
21 Guardian Bank 3.8 0.8 Private
22 Habib AG Zurich 3.8 0.8 Foreign
23 Imperial Bank Limited 3.7 0.8 Private
24 Victoria Commercial Bank Ltd 3.5 0.8 Private
25 Middle East Bank of Kenya 3.3 0.7 Foreign
26 Habib Bank Limited 3.3 0.7 Foreign
27 African Banking Corporation 3.3 0.7 Private
28 Southern Credit Banking Corp. 2.9 0.6 Private
29 Development Bank of Kenya 2.7 0.6 Foreign
30 Equatorial Commercial Bank 2.5 0.6 Private
31 Delphis Bank Limited 2.3 0.5 Private
32 Consolidated Bank of Kenya 2.3 0.5 Government
33 Credit Bank Limited 2.0 0.4 Private
34 Charterhouse Bank Ltd. 2.0 0.4 Private
35 Transnational Bank Limited 1.9 0.4 Private
36 K-REP Bank 1.9 0.4 Foreign
37 Industrial Development Bank 1.6 0.4 Government
38 Chase Bank Limited 1.5 0.3 Private
39 Paramount-Universal Bank 1.1 0.2 Private
40 Fidelity Commercial Bank 1.0 0.2 Private
41 Dubai Bank Limited 0.7 0.2 Private
42 City Finance Bank 0.7 0.1 Private
43 Daima Bank Limited 0.4 0.1 Private
TOTAL 448.3 100.0
Privately-owned banks 130.4 28.9
Government-owned banks 88.5 19.8
Foreign-owned banks 229.3 50.9
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from the CBK.
Total assets
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ANNEX II:  DECOMPOSITION OF THE INTEREST SPREAD 
 
Loans have to be financed with available deposits, i.e. deposits net of reserves with the central 
bank, or L = (1 - RR)*D, where L are loans, RR reserve requirements, and D deposits. We 
calculate a weighted average lending rate across loans of different maturities and a weighted 
average deposit rate across demand, savings and time deposits of different maturities. However, 
since we do not have loan and deposit maturity distribution data separate for local and foreign 
currency, we assume a similar maturity structure across different currencies.   
 
LLP is defined as loans loss provisions net of recoveries relative to loans. Since we do not have 
data on loan loss provisions on local and foreign currency loans, we assume similar default rates. 
 
OC are the overhead costs attributable to loans. We identify the share of overhead costs 
attributable to loans by calculating the share of loan interest revenue in total revenue. We assume 
a similar size ratio for loans across local and foreign currencies. 
 
We use a tax rate τ of 30 percent, since this is not only the official corporate tax rate, but also 
because it was indicated to the mission that tax payments constitute around 30 percent of profits.  
 
We define iL as loan interest rate and iD as interest rate on time deposits, using the one-year rates, 
averaged over all banks and over the year 2002.  
 
The profit margin (profit relative to loans) can then be calculated as residual after accounting for 
the other four components:  
 
PM = (1-τ)*(iL-LLP – iD/(1 – R) – OC) 
 
Rearranging gives us the sum of the different components of the interest rate spread: 
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